Faking a Famine: Politicization & Propaganda

Executive Summary

Famine is a status defined by clear, stringent criteria, yet claims of famine in Gaza represent a profound misrepresentation of the reality on the ground, far beyond a mere technical oversight. With food prices falling precipitously in the last month, Hamas attempts to inflate death rates failing to claim even a fraction of the required threshold, and opaque and skewed data that does not follow IPC standards, the IPC has failed to substantiate its claims or even acknowledge some of these facts. This false narrative, propelled by Hamas—a designated terrorist group that hoards and steals food from civilians—undermines humanitarian efforts and erodes the credibility of a once-respected organization. 

This report examines troubling patterns and methodological shortcomings in the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) system’s assessment of famine risk. It reveals how the IPC’s 12 publications since October 2023 have amplified this distorted narrative. This culminated in a questionable classification of famine in the Gaza Governorate in August 2025, despite credible data suggesting otherwise, challenges in conflict zones notwithstanding. Closer scrutiny of their data reveals flaws and biases that undermine the strong and far-reaching assertions.

The recent IPC report, notably lacking data sources and transparency, casts doubt on its integrity, hinting at a concerning reliance on information potentially filtered through Hamas. Moreover, the presumed abysmal nutritional state of remaining live hostages, starkly evidenced by Hamas-released videos, contrasts with the IPC’s silence on their plight. The IPC’s credibility is thus undermined by these patterns, which hint at potential bias and the intrusion of politicization into its work. 

 Key Findings:

• The IPC’s predictive record raises concerns, with projections of famine by May 2024 not materialising, and methodology and assumptions remaining unquestioned. 

• Such projections and claims of famine being a “critical risk” or ambiguously “playing out” proved unsupported by population-level mortality data meeting Phase 5 standards, whereby IPC communication outpaces evidence on a core pillar (mortality). 

• The IPC has also misapplied mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) thresholds to imply famine, relying on problematic data sources and omitting key pre-war baselines, diverging from its own guidelines

• The pattern of unverified warnings was compounded by the use of emotive language, which diverges from the sober, data-driven tone of the Sudan 2024 Alert, despite higher mortality there. 

• The IPC’s Gaza narrative betrays selective framing, attributing food scarcity solely to Israeli actions – “blockades”, “bombardments”, and so on – while omitting Hamas’s aid diversion, humanitarian inefficiencies, and the international community’s failure to provide refuge for displaced civilians in need. 

Background 

The IPC is the humanitarian sector’s consensus framework for assessing acute food insecurity. Using a five-phase scale to categorize food insecurity, ranging from minimal to catastrophic levels, the IPC categorizes situations as: Minimal/None (Phase 1), Stressed (Phase 2), Crisis (Phase 3), Emergency (Phase 4), and Catastrophe/Famine (Phase 5). Each phase indicates a different level of severity and has implications for appropriate interventions. The IPC has provided a framework for classifications in countries suffering from food insecurity and malnutrition, and is used by NGOs and UN agencies to assess and respond to crises. 

The IPC has benchmarks for all phases. ‘Famine’ (Phase 5) requires three pillars to meet thresholds: (1) extreme food consumption deficits; (2) global acute malnutrition (GAM) at ≥30% or severe wasting at ≥10% (area-level); and (3) non-trauma crude death rate (CDR) ≥2/10,000/day (≥4/10,000/day for under-5s). 

Yet, this framework’s credibility is increasingly suspect in its application to Gaza since the Hamas-led atrocities against Southern Israel on October 7, 2023. Since the onset of the Gaza war following the Hamas-led terrorist atrocities on Southern Israel on October 7th, IPC has issued 12 publications on the situation in Gaza. These include four Famine Review Committee (FRC) reports in December 2023, March 2024 June 2024 and August 2024 ; four detailed ‘Special Brief’ reports in December 2023, March 2024, November 2024, and June 2025; two ‘Special Snapshots’ in May 2025 and August 2025; and two ‘IPC Alerts’ in November 2024 and July 2025. All publications alleged ongoing or impending dire situations of food security with the latest classifying the Gaza Governate as being in a state of famine. They have consistently assessed that virtually the entire population of Gaza is categorized as being in ‘Crisis’ (Phase 3) or higher, with parts of the population being either at or plausibly approaching ‘Famine’ level (Phase 5).

“The FRC is activated when a country IPC analysis results in: (i) a classification of Famine (Phase 5, Area), (ii) a projection of Famine, or (iii) a classification of households in Catastrophe (Phase 5) that may lead to an Area Famine” (IPC Technical Manual Version 3.1, 2021). Accordingly, as noted above, the FRC was convened four times for Gaza, resulting in reports in December 2023, March 2024, and June 2024, as well as an Alert in November 2024.

The FRC’s activation – triggered by Phase 5 projections or classifications – occurred five times, yet the evidence underpinning these dire assessments remains questionable. 

The IPC classifications carry significant weight among its global partnership (UN agencies, NGOs, and national humanitarian actors), shaping policy and guiding research. For this reason, the quality and credibility of IPC publications is crucial for international responses to humanitarian crises, making their methodological integrity paramount. However, the consistent escalation of alarm without substantiated outcomes suggests a troubling agenda, setting the stage for a deeper examination of its Gaza-specific failings.

Evidence of Malpractice

Warning Without Weight: Unrealized Projections

The IPC has consistently projected worsening conditions and likely famine in Gaza across its reports, yet a troubling pattern emerges: these predictions fail to materialize despite the realization of outlined drivers. Since December 2023, the IPC has warned of famine driven by hostilities, restricted aid, and Israeli military actions, with specific triggers like the Rafah invasion and escalating control coming to fruition (IPC Special Brief, 2024). The December 2023 analysis predicted famine by May 2024 without a ceasefire, while the March 2024 Special Brief and June 2024 Famine Review Committee deemed it “imminent,” citing intensifying conflict (IPC Famine Review, 2023; IPC Special Brief, 2024; IPC Famine Review, 2024). However, no area has met the required non-trauma crude death rate (CDR) ≥2/10,000/day. The December 2023 FRC report acknowledges that “the all-cause death toll [note, not ‘non-trauma’] reported by the Gaza Ministry of Health (MOH) has not surpassed the extremely high death rate associated with a Famine classification” (IPC Famine Review, 2023). To be more precise, it had not – and has since not – even come close. Moreover, the June 2024 report attributed the absence of famine to unanticipated aid increases, sidestepping methodological flaws (IPC Famine Review, 2024).

This repeated disconnect between predicted drivers and outcomes – persisting through the July 2025 Alert’s claim of a “worst-case scenario of Famine” – casts doubt on the IPC’s analytical rigor and impartiality on Gaza (IPC Alert: Gaza, 2025). The organization’s failure to acknowledge misjudgments, instead doubling down with assertions like “risk remains as high as at any time” (IPC Famine Review, 2024), suggests a bias toward alarmist narratives. 

Compounding this, the IPC overlooks critical famine drivers, such as Hamas’s aid diversion (see below, Blame and the Burden of Action), and eschews proven preventative measures. The IPC has not advocated for Hamas’s surrender, refuge for Gaza’s civilian population attempting to flee a combat zone, or cooperation to halt aid militarization – options that could address root causes.

The selective focus of the assessments raises concerns about the influence of political considerations at the expense of an evidence-based approach. The July 2025 Alert’s vague reference to “mounting hunger-related deaths” without area-representative data further undermines its credibility, echoing unrealized projections from November 2024 and beyond (IPC Alert: Gaza, 2025). By ignoring alternative solutions and misjudging drivers, the IPC not only misrepresents Gaza’s crisis but also jeopardizes effective humanitarian strategies, highlighting a need for transparent reevaluation of its methodologies and objectives.

Data Discrepancies and Death Rates 

The IPC has suggested famine in Gaza despite insufficient evidence, contravening its own stringent criteria. The IPC mandates “clear and compelling evidence” of extreme food insecurity (20% of households), acute malnutrition (30% of children), and a non-trauma crude death rate (CDR) ≥2/10,000/day due to starvation or malnutrition-disease interactions for a “Famine With Solid Evidence” classification (IPC Famine Fact Sheet, 2024). Gaza’s data fall short, lacking area-representative CDR evidence.

Instead, the IPC applies a “Famine With Reasonable Evidence” category – previously “Famine Likely” (IPC Technical Manual Version 3.1, 2021) – allowing classification when solid evidence exists for just “two of the three thresholds… and analysts reasonably assess from the broader evidence that the threshold for the third outcome has likely been reached. (IPC Famine Fact Sheet, 2024)”  

The July 2025 Alert claims food consumption and malnutrition thresholds are surpassed in Gaza City, yet fails to provide non-trauma CDR data meeting the 2/10,000/day benchmark (IPC Alert: Gaza, 2025). Malnutrition estimates taken from the Hamas-controlled Health Ministry in Gaza (themselves liable to be inflated), and cited by the World Health Organization (WHO) and other international actors at the time, reported 74 malnutrition-related deaths in 2025, 63 of which were reported in the month of July itself (WHO, 2025). These do not reflect area-wide famine levels, which under the latest IPC snapshot should reach beyond 100 deaths per day from only starvation-related causes. 

Compounding this discrepancy, evidence suggests IPC data may reflect Hamas propaganda. A review of 12 prominent cases of malnutrition highlighted in the media found all 12 to suffer from additional, undisclosed metabolic, genetic, and chronic conditions, generally accompanying the patient from birth, indicating inflated figures to serve political interests. (Reingold and Lukyanova, 2025). 

In sum, without a non-trauma CDR meeting the IPC threshold over a representative population and period, Phase 5 (Famine) cannot be classified, even if two pillars were met. Claiming that famine is likely or “playing out” simply does not match the IPC’s own data and benchmarks, and certainly not the classification of famine reached in the August 2025 IPC reports. 

Shifting Standards, Measuring Malnutrition 

The IPC has introduced concerning inconsistencies in its famine assessments for Gaza, raising questions about the integrity of its methodological approach. A primary issue lies in the application of mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) with a 15% threshold to suggest famine conditions, a practice that diverges significantly from established IPC guidelines and prior conflict zone assessments. According to IPC protocols, MUAC is intended to measure Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) and is explicitly limited to classifying Phase 4 (Emergency), not Phase 5 (Famine), which requires a weight-for-height (WHZ) threshold of 30% (IPC Technical Manual Version 3.1, 2021). The July 2025 Gaza report and the August 2025 reports, however, employ MUAC data to imply famine status and to classify famine, despite its methodological unsuitability, as it cannot reliably distinguish the severity needed for a famine declaration. This misapplication undermines the IPC’s own standards, which demand rigorous evidence across multiple indicators, including a non-trauma crude death rate (CDR) exceeding 2 per 10,000 individuals daily – a threshold not met in Gaza’s reported data (Zlochin, 2025).

Further complicating the assessment, the IPC’s reliance on hospital screening data rather than community-based surveys represents a clear departure from its guidelines, introducing significant bias. IPC methodology prohibits the use of health facility data due to its tendency to exclude healthy children, thereby inflating malnutrition prevalence estimates. In Gaza, the IPC has instead drawn heavily from hospital records, which are skewed toward sicker populations, artificially elevating reported malnutrition rates. This violation of protocol not only distorts the data but also compromises the objectivity of the famine analysis, as hospital-based figures fail to reflect the broader population’s health status (Zlochin, 2025).

Adding to these concerns is the IPC’s failure to account for pre-war baseline data, a critical oversight that further weakens its Gaza assessments. Prior to the conflict, MUAC-based GAM prevalence in Gaza stood at approximately 4%, markedly higher than the 0.8% recorded via WHZ measurements. This reversed relationship – where MUAC typically underestimates GAM compared to WHZ globally – should have been a key consideration in adjusting thresholds, as mandated by IPC guidelines. Yet, these reports consistently omit this baseline, rendering the 15% MUAC threshold contextually inappropriate and significantly overestimating current malnutrition levels (Zlochin, 2025). This neglect suggests a selective approach that prioritizes narrative over accuracy, a pattern that contrasts sharply with the IPC’s application of WHZ standards in other conflict zones like Somalia and Sudan.

The cumulative effect of these methodological flaws is an analysis that significantly overestimates malnutrition rates and lacks robust evidentiary support, risking the IPC’s credibility and misguiding global perceptions of Gaza’s crisis. By deviating from established practices – misusing MUAC, relying on biased hospital data, and ignoring pre-war disparities – the IPC perpetuates a narrative that disproportionately attributes famine to external factors, such as Israeli actions, while overlooking local dynamics. This double standard not only skews humanitarian priorities but also erodes trust in the IPC’s ability to deliver impartial, evidence-based assessments, highlighting the need for a reevaluation of its Gaza-specific methodologies.

Methodological Flaws in Food Availability Assessment

The IPC relies on survey data taken from a list of UNICEF cash aid recipients to assess food consumption in Gaza. These lists were compiled together with the Hamas Ministry of Social Development and inform IPC famine predictions, exhibiting a critical methodological flaw. (Herzberg, 2025). Hamas’s selection of recipients biases the data, enabling exaggerated claims of “imminent famine”, compromising the IPC’s methodology (Zlochin, 2025). Such selection enables Hamas to skew the sample through preferential aid distribution, by referring the poorest, most loyal, or sickest individuals to researchers, and by pressuring those surveyed to provide inflated numbers, which leads to a non-representative and inaccurate assessment of the situation. Research confirms that self-reported dietary surveys in conflict zones suffer from recall bias (Muhyie et al., 2025). 

This flaw is exacerbated in Gaza, where restricted access and aid diversion distort survey integrity. The March 2024 IPC Famine review highlights data manipulation risks in conflict settings (IPC Famine Review, 2024). By relying on compromised surveys, the IPC risks inflating famine narratives, undermining its credibility, and misguiding humanitarian responses in Gaza’s complex crisis.

Just as the IPC’s survey methodologies measuring food consumption overstated crisis, so too their assessments have undercounted incoming food imports. Earlier IPC assessments systematically ignored all food imports not coordinated by the UN, including national efforts of third countries and commercial imports (IPC Famine Review, 2024). By failing to make use of publicly available data, the IPC exposes itself to allegations of politicization and bias in its reporting on the humanitarian situation in Gaza.

Language and Tone

The Gaza Alert of July 2025 employs emotive, advocacy-driven language, with phrases like “worst-case scenario,” “unprecedented levels,” and “catastrophic human suffering.” Vivid descriptors such as “widespread starvation, malnutrition, and disease” amplify its tone, diverging from the IPC’s standard of sober, objective reporting (IPC Alert: Gaza, 2025). 

In contrast, the Sudan Alert of March 2024 maintains a professional, measured tone, using technical language focused on quantified data and projections. Terms like “escalating conflict” and “deteriorating situation” appear without the emotional intensity of the Gaza report. Despite similar access constraints, the Sudan Alert adheres to IPC norms of neutrality, specific attribution, and actionable recommendations, while the Gaza Alert’s advocacy-tilted framing lacks such discipline. The different tone is all the more striking considering the high mortality rates in Sudan. The IPC’s Sudan Alert cites 2.5 deaths per 10,000 individuals - a figure unmatched by the Gaza report (IPC Alert: Sudan, 2024). Further, 61,000 deaths were reported in Khartoum State between April 2023 and June 2024, not long after the IPC Alert was published, 35,000 of whom were attributed to non-trauma causes (London School of Hygeine and Tropical Medicine, LSHTM, 2024).

Blame and the Burden of Action

The IPC publications on Gaza consistently attribute famine drivers to Israeli actions while notably omitting the role of humanitarian organizations’ failures and Hamas’s practices. Across 12 reports, the IPC identifies factors such as Israeli bombardment, population displacement, restricted humanitarian access, blockade, looting, attacks on health infrastructure, loss of agricultural capacity, limited food imports, critical gaps in water, sanitation, and hygiene, and “widespread, intense, and sustained ground and air operations” (IPC Special Brief, 2024). Notably absent, however, are references to Hamas’s diversion, hoarding, and price gouging of aid to fund its operations. Indeed, UN figures themselves inform that 85% (by tonnage) of its aid food trucks were ‘intercepted’, either by crowds or armed actors (Makovsky, 2025; UNOPS). Similarly, the IPC publications call for an end to attacks on health facilities, while omitting mention of Hamas militarization of health facilities (IPC Famine Review, 2023).

This selective framing is evident in the IPC’s emphasis on high food costs without acknowledging Hamas’s role in exacerbating scarcity through hoarding and profiteering. Hamas, whose looting of aid has been widely reported, establishes its own supply systems to stockpile food, which it then sells for profit at high prices, funding its terror activities and causing suffering for impoverished civilians in Gaza; suffering which is exploited by circulating images of the humanitarian crisis it facilitated to serve its propaganda war against Israel. Similarly, while attacks on health infrastructure are highlighted, the IPC publications fail to address Hamas’s militarization of hospitals, a critical driver of dysfunction. 

Even when discussing restricted humanitarian access, the IPC avoids attributing responsibility to non-Israeli factors, such as Hamas’s interference or the inefficiencies of aid distribution. Notably, the only humanitarian entity criticized is the Israel- and U.S.-backed Gaza Humanitarian Fund (GHF), despite undistributed UN aid signaling broader organizational failures.

The IPC’s narrative extends to its terminology. Recent reports designate areas with Israeli presence or evacuation orders as “militarized zones” while labeling Hamas-controlled areas as “safe spaces,” a framing that echoes earlier reports’ biased language (IPC Alert: Gaza, 2025). This selective lens shapes a one-sided attribution of blame, ignoring Hamas’s actions that prolong Gaza’s humanitarian crisis.

Equally concerning is the IPC’s narrow focus on a single solution while neglecting proven strategies for mitigating famine in conflict zones. Indeed, the IPC pushes for the “cessation of hostilities and the restoration of humanitarian space” as “essential first steps in eliminating any risk of Famine”, not only prioritizing this one action item, but also conditioning any serious efforts to combat the threat of famine on its implementation (IPC Famine Review, 2023). The reports do not advocate for Hamas’s surrender, UN cooperation with the GHF, cessation of aid diversion, or provision of refuge for displaced civilians fleeing a combat zone. For instance, the June 2024 report demands that “the IDF should facilitate access by the UN and other humanitarian actors to all crossing points” and insists that “persistent attacks on hospitals, health posts, ambulances, water services, civilian telecoms services, and IDP sites must cease” (IPC, June 2024, p. 24; see also (IPC Famine Review, 2023; March 2024). Yet, these calls fail to address Hamas’s role in militarizing civilian infrastructure or obstructing aid delivery.

By consistently attributing famine to Israeli actions while ignoring Hamas’s contributions and other viable mitigation strategies, the IPC constructs a narrative that distorts accountability and undermines effective humanitarian responses. 

Conclusion

This report’s analysis reveals a troubling pattern in the IPC system’s communications on Gaza, where the lines between projection, risk, and classification have been dangerously blurred, particularly regarding the critical mortality pillar. Since October 2023, the IPC’s 12 publications have consistently projected worsening conditions and imminent famine, citing drivers like the Rafah invasion and restricted aid. Yet these predictions have failed to materialize, as evidenced by the absence of area-wide non-trauma crude death rate (CDR) data ≥2/10,000/day. The March 2024 Famine Review Committee’s admission that this threshold was likely unmet, despite “famine imminent” claims, underscores a concerning inconsistency that casts doubt on the IPC’s analytical rigor. This disconnect, persisting through the July 2025 Alert’s vague “worst-case scenario,” suggests a methodology strained by significant bias, undermining its credibility among stakeholders.

Compounding this, the IPC’s reliance on flawed data – misapplied mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) thresholds, hospital-skewed malnutrition figures, and compromised surveys influenced by Hamas – further erodes trust. The omission of pre-war baselines, where MUAC prevalence (4%) far exceeded weight-for-height (0.8%), and the use of prohibited health facility data, inflate malnutrition estimates, distorting the famine narrative. Moreover, the IPC’s selective attribution of blame to Israeli actions, while ignoring Hamas’s aid diversion, as well as failures of many humanitarian agencies, reflects a troubling agenda. This bias is amplified by emotive language – “unprecedented suffering,” “widespread starvation” – that diverges from the sober tone of the Sudan 2024 Alert, despite higher mortality there, highlighting a double standard in its Gaza-specific approach.

The integrity costs are profound: weakened confidence in the IPC jeopardizes life-saving prioritization and misguides global responses to Gaza’s crisis. The report’s evidence – unrealised May 2024 projections, the Free Press’s exposure of propagandized malnutrition cases, and the IPC’s silence on alternative solutions like Hamas surrender or civilian refuge – points to a system swayed by political considerations rather than evidence-based assessment. This pattern not only complicates humanitarian efforts but also risks perpetuating a narrative that overlooks local dynamics, such as Hamas’s role in prolonging suffering. Such instances of malpractice by the IPC undermine efforts to accurately assess and effectively address the situation in Gaza, and risk harming future humanitarian endeavors elsewhere.